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Book Review Essay
Who's In and Who's Out: Racial Discrimination in Sports
IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA. By Kenneth L. Shropshire.t
New York and London: New York University Press, 1996. Pp. xxvii, 212. $24.95.
Reviewed by Timothy Davis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Kenneth Shropshire's important book In Black and White examines
the controversial issue of racism in professional sports.' Like scholars before him,
Professor Shropshire argues that sports, as a microcosm of American society,
reflects American social realities in which racism and discrimination remain
dominant. 3 The essence of In Black and White is Professor Shropshire's contention
that the persistence of racism denies African-Americans ownership and leadership
opportunities in professional sports.4 Professor Shropshire specifically analyzes the
manifestations of unconscious racism in sports, and the law's ineffectiveness to
enhance racial equity.5 He concludes with suggestions that, if followed, could
diversify the ownership and management ranks of the major sports franchises.
6
Readers are likely to find Professor Shropshire's rendering of the state of
African-Americans 7 in sports sobering and disturbing. First, In Black and White
t Associate Professor of Legal Studies, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania. Author
of The Sports Franchise Game and Corruption in Collegiate Sports.
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the research assistance of Tonya Parker, Jeffrey K. Malonson, and Andrea M. Evans.
1. KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, IN BLACK AND WHITE: RACE AND SPORTS IN AMERICA (1996).
2. See, e.g., D.STANLEYErTZEN&GEoRGEH.SAGE, SOCIOLOGY OFNORTHAMERICANSPORT 17(5th ed.
1993) (commenting that sports provides a useful institution for examining the complexities of the larger society
since it represents a microcosm of the society in which it is embedded).
3. See generally Harry Edwards, Playoffs and Payoffs: The African-American Athlete as an Institutional
Resource, in THE STATE OF BLACK AMERICAN 85 (Billy J. Tidwell ed., 1994) (discussing how sports reflects and
recapitulates America's evolving social realities, including race); Ben Lombardo, The Harlem Globetrotters and
the Perpetuation of the Black Stereotype, 35 PHYSICAL EDUC. 60 (1978) (acknowledging that racism is a problem
in athletics just as it is in the rest of American society).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See infra Parts IV, V.
6. See infra Part IX.
7. In the preface to In Black and White, Professor Shropshire acknowledges that racism limits opportunities
in sports to members of ethnic groups other than African-Americans. He also notes the criticisms of the two-
sided-black and white-view of race in America. Notwithstanding these observations, analysis of racial
discrimination encountered by other ethnic groups in sports is beyond the scope of In Black and White. Professor
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rebuts the popularly held belief that the elimination of overt racism-that excluded
blacks from majority professional sports teams-signaled the end of discrimination
in American sports. This present-day belief stems from African-American athletes'
disproportionate representation in major sports such as football and basketball
According to one commentator:
[B]lack visibility in collegiate and professional sports has merely served to
mask the racism that pervaded the entire sport establishment. According to
these critics, the existence of racism in collegiate and professional sports is
especially insidious. They hold that promoters of and commentators on
athletics have made sports sacred by projecting its image as the single
institution relatively immune from racism
Secondly, Professor Shropshire effectively refutes the belief that sports is
perhaps the only venue in American society where the playing field is level and
opportunities for advancement are unimpeded by racial prejudice. According to this
view, sports is an endeavor in which one can be judged solely on the basis of merit.
Thus, African-Americans are presumed to have an equal opportunity to share in the
rewards arising from sports participation.' Professor Shropshire's book exposes the
reality of this desired, yet elusive, ideal.
In Black and White's importance lies in more than its examination of racism in
sports. Professor Shropshire makes a major contribution to a growing area of
scholarly discourse that addresses the intersection of law, economics, sociology, and
sport. As such, his book will provide a valuable resource for scholars and others
engaged in the critical assessment of sports. Furthermore, readers interested in racial
Shropshire justifies his narrow focus on blacks, and in particular African-American males, by what he views as the
distinct experiences of blacks in the history of American sports. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at xxii-xxiii. The
uniqueness of the African-American experience is attributable to their prominence in American sports. ErrzEN &
SAGE, supra note 2, at 323. This prominence ensues in large part from the perception among blacks that sports is
one avenue for potentially rapid socio-economic mobility. HARRY EDWARDS, SOCIOLOGY OF SPORT 188-89 (1973).
African-Americans' peculiar status in American sports is also attributable to stereotypes such as the myth that
blacks possess innate athletic superiority. Id. at 190-91.
8. Peter Donnelly, Approaches to Social Inequality in the Sociology of Sport, 48 QUEST 221, 230 (1996);
see EnrzEN & SAGE, supra note 2, at 323, 332 (noting that the disproportion between African-Americans in society
and their participation on major sports teams obscures the racism existing in sports).
9. ErrzEN & SAGE, supra note 2, at 332. The belief that racism has been eradicated in sports also reflects
the differing perceptions of white and black Americans. As suggested by Professor Shropshire, whites and blacks
view events differently, including the impact of racism. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 2-3. A series of surveys
conducted in 1991 confirmed that, unlike blacks, many white Americans refuse to acknowledge race as a factor that
influences sports. In contrast to white Americans, the majority of African-Americans surveyed believed that
prejudice remains a component of sports. Jim Myers. Race Still a Player: Stereotypes Pit Ability vs. Intellect, USA
TODAY, Dec. 16, 1991, at IA. For example, 73% of the blacks surveyed believed that racism limits coaching
opportunities for African-Americans, while only 31% of whites held that view. Race in Sports: A Black-and-Whilte
Issue, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 1992, at 3C.
10. Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in College Athletics, 22
FORDHAMi URB. LJ. 615, 639 (1995) [hereinafter Davis, Myth of the Superspade].
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equity in settings other than sports will appreciate In Black and White's theoretical
analysis of the subject.
Through his thorough assessment of racism's impact on sports, Professor
Shropshire also elevates the academic community's intellectual discussion regarding
sports-a substantive area that has tended to be trivialized." This predilection of
academicians to marginalize the myriad of legal and social issues that arise in sports
is surprising given the commonly held view that sports serves as a microcosm of the
broader culture.'2 Like Professor Shropshire and others, I agree that the study of
sports provides an excellent forum within which to examine complex social issues
that confront American society. Commenting on the significance of the study of
sports, sociologist Harry Edwards recently wrote, "American sports invariably,
unavoidably, and quite predictably looks, sounds, and behaves very much like
American society.' 3 Given my agreement with this view, I read In Black and White
with considerable anticipation. While in a few instances greater analysis would have
been instructive, 14 Professor Shropshire's book provides a comprehensive and
thoughtful analysis of racism in the upper echelons of professional sports.
Professor Shropshire crafts arguments that convincingly flow from his theoretical
premise. He achieves his goal of informing readers of his philosophical framework
in his thought-provoking "Introduction." Indeed, In Black and White's most signi-
ficant and long-lasting achievement may reside in its introduction and first chapter.
In these parts of the book, Professor Shropshire establishes a theoretical approach to
assessing the racial conundrum in professional sports that is fairly novel to sports law
scholarship. Consequently, a significant part of this Essay is devoted to examining
his proposed theory.
11. See Rodney K. Smith, When Ignorance Is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial and Gender Equity in
Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 MO. L. REv. 329, 333-34 (1996) (discussing the harmful consequences of the
unjustified marginalization of sports by the academic community); Elliott J. Gom & Michael Oriard, Taking Sports
Seriously, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 24, 1995, at A52 (criticizing the relegation of the study of sports to the
fringes of the academic mainstream).
12. See ErrZEN & SAGE, supra note 2, at 17 (stating that sports represents a microcosm of society); Paul M.
Anderson, Racism in Sports: A Question of Ethics, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 357, 361 (1996) (noting that most
commentators agree that sports is a reflection of society in that it often acts as a microcosm of society).
13. Edwards, supra note 3, at 87. Professor Harry Edwards further argues that the position of black athletes
in sports serves as a barometer of the state of Black America. Id. at 86; see ErrZEN & SAGE, supra note 2, at 323
("Rather than be free from racism, sport as a microcosm of the larger society reflects the same racial problems as
society."); George H. Sage, Introduction to RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ATHLETE'S
EXPERIENCE 3 (Dana Brooks & Ronald Althouse eds., 1993) (noting that racism has been a salient part of the
history of college athletics); Lodis Rhodes & Johnny S. Butler, Sport and Racism: A Contribution to Theory
Building in Race Relations?, 55 SOC. Sci. Q. 919, 922 (1975) (noting the significant extent to which racism has
impacted the participation of black athletes throughout the history of organized American sport activity).
14. See infra notes 49-61, 78-80 and accompanying text.
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II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Professor Shropshire begins with the contention that the statistical under-
representation of African-Americans in top-level positions reflects racial bias in
professional sports. 5 However, he quickly acknowledges the shortcomings attendant
to a strict reliance on statistics to determine the extent of racism in professional
sports.16 According to Professor Shropshire, the story of racism in sports can only be
effectively told by embracing other themes-in this instance, themes central to criti-
cal race scholarship. Thus, the analytical framework of In Black and White is shaped
substantially by themes appearing in critical race literature. 7
One such theme is the critical assessment of "themes that dominate mainstream
legal discourse,"'18 including the notion of colorblindness. 19 In the context of con-
stitutional doctrine, the colorblindness principle disapproves of the use of race-
dependent decisionmaking and conduct. 20 "By race-dependent, it is meant decisions
and conduct that would have been different but for the race of those benefitted or
disadvantaged by them."2' Although originating in the constitutional context so as
to limit certain governmental conduct, advocates of the colorblindness norm argue
for its applicability to private arms-length transactions.
22
According to Professor Shropshire, sports provides a striking example of why
reliance on colorblind policies is premature. 3 He stresses that "[f]ew, if any, of the
people in power in sports in the United States are colorblind, and few make
15. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
16. "It is completely unrealistic to assume that individuals of each race will gravitate with mathematical
exactitude to each employer or union absent unlawful discrimination." Id. at 6 (quoting Local 28 Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421,494 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
17. For an excellent discussion of the themes appearing in critical race literature, see John 0. Calmore,
Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural
World, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2129 (1992), and see also Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice
Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REV. 95, 96 n.4 (1990) (discussing the nature of critical race scholarship).
18. Professor Calmore describes these themes as including concepts "such as formal equality, individualized
opportunity, neutrality, objectivity, color blindness, and meritocracy." Calmore, supra note 17, at 2161-62 n.107.
19. See id. (commenting on how critical race theory unmasks themes in mainstream legal discourse); Bryan
K. Fair, Forvard: Rethinking the Colorblindness Model, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 1, 5, 68-69 (1993) (criticizing the
colorblindness concept as antithetical to the interests of people of color).
20. T. AlexanderAleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1060, 1063 (1991). Justice
John M. Harlan is said to have introduced the colorblindness concept into American constitutional law in his
dissenting opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) ("There is no caste system here. Our
Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.").
21. Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 1063. Similarly, Professor Flagg defines the colorblindness principle as
disapproving of the use of a race-specific criterion in decision-making regardless of the "race of the decisionmaker
or of the persons respectively advantaged or burdened by that criterion." Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now
I See": White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 1005
(1993). Professor Flagg adds that the principle of colorblindness objects to holding persons responsible for personal
characteristics over which they have no control, such as race or gender. Id. at 1011.
22. Aleinikoff, supra note 20, at 1063.
23. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 7.
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employment and other management decisions without regard to race." 24 Professor
Shropshire explains that owners in sports do in fact believe that they conduct their
business without regard to race.25 "But this innocent conduct of business may be
accompanied by an ingrained view that the person to hire should look like the
previous white males that were hired." Elaborating, Professor Shropshire advances
the point made by other scholars that racially neutral hiring policies fail to reflect
neutrality because they are made in the context of the cultural background of
decisionmakers.27 From his perspective, "race is a determining factor for the absence
of blacks in the positions of power in sports. 28
Professor Shropshire underscores this assertion by embracing another theme that
appears often in critical race scholarship.29 He posits that-reflective of American
society-unconscious rather than overt racial discrimination circumscribes high-level
managerial and ownership opportunities for African-Americans in professional
sports.30 In the world of sports, the manifestations of unconscious racism include
decisions by owners not to afford African-Americans access to power positions.
31
Without stating so, Professor Shropshire essentially argues that these decisions are
frequently motivated by stereotypes that "provide the basis for assessing individual
and group conduct. ' 32 As I note below, a more forceful statement by Professor
Shropshire regarding the impact of stereotypes of the "dumb black jock" would have
enhanced In Black and White's critical assessment of racism's impact on hiring
decisions.
Following the lead of other noted scholars, the final component of In Blacks and
White's theoretical framework is the view that racism is a permanent feature of
American society. Professor Derrick Bell wrote that "racism is an integral,
permanent, and indestructible component of this society. 33 Professor Harry Edwards
added that "racism is today a highly mutable constituent feature of American liberal
democracy. 34
While adopting the theme that racism is a permanent fixture in American sports,
Professor Shropshire avoids taking a stance that is either overly pessimistic or
24. Id.
25. Id. at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law,
45 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1152 (1993) (discussing the illusions of fairness as well as the harm to minorities ensuing
from a race neutral model).
28. SHROPSHIRE, supra note I, at 15.
29. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, tile Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
30. SHROPSHIRE, supra note I, at 15.
31. Id.at8-9,15.
32. Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 642.
33. Derrick Bell, The Racism Is Pennanent 77Tesis: Courageous Revelation or Unconscious Denial of Racial
Genocide, 22 CAP. U. L. REv. 571, 573 (1993).
34. Edwards, supra note 3, at 87.
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idealistic. Noting the significance of the problem of race, he aligns with those who
view the recognition of racism's permanence as a necessary antecedent to consigning
it to its proper place among other problems faced by African-Americans. 35 Professor
Shropshire and others believe that such recognition will hasten the development of
strategies that will generate black advancement in sports and other mainstream
institutions of American society.36 In this regard, Shropshire states: "The key point
here is that the present cannot help but be tainted by the racism of the past. Hence
attempts at reform must take into account [racism's] presence for the historical
foundations of the sports business."37
II. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF RACISM IN SPORTS
Chapter One, which is appropriately entitled "The Roots of Racism and Dis-
crimination in Sports," provides an opportunity for Professor Shropshire to develop
further the theme that racism, as it currently exists in sports, can only be accurately
interpreted in light of the historical experiences of African-American athletes. Thus,
in this chapter he outlines the historical impact of race on African-Americans' sports
experience.
In his historical summary of blacks in American sports, Professor Shropshire
notes that during the early years of professional and collegiate sports-a period
extending from after the Civil War to the late 1800s and early 1900s-blacks
participated in organized sports at the amateur and professional levels?8 He points
out, however, that the right to participate during this period was not accompanied by
equality of treatment.39 Expounding on this point, Shropshire emphasizes that
African-Americans were both exploited for their athletic ability and subjected to the
indignities that flowed from racial discrimination. 4' To illustrate, African-American
athletes suffered the racial epithets of fans and opposing players and the dis-
criminatory acts (e.g., physical attacks) of their own teammates.4! ' Professor
Shropshire illustrates the nature of such discrimination by recounting an experience
of African-American, All-American Paul Robeson. "On the first day of practice, I
was attacked by twenty-one guys. All the guys on defense, and all of the guys on my
team." 
42
The early years of inclusion, albeit limited, were followed by a period during
which formal and informal rules excluded blacks from organized professional and
35. Id. at 87-88; see Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 678.
36. Edwards, supra note 3, at 87-88.
37. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 11.
38. Id. at 27-28.
39. Id. at 25-26.
40. Id. at 25.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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collegiate sports.43 Professor Shropshire cites two reasons for the segregation of
sports:
The most obvious [reason] is simply the desire of whites not to associate
with African-Americans.... Associated with this desire for separation was
... the other broad explanation: a view that African-Americans are inferior.
This view, of course, finds its roots in slavery and provided a common
excuse for separation of the races."
This period of segregation was followed by what Professor Shropshire describes
as the reintegration of sports.45 He underscores the significance of Jackie Robinson's
joining the Dodgers in 1947 by noting that professional baseball had remained
segregated since 1889.46 However, Robinson's signing led the way for the deseg-
regation of other professional leagues and of college sports over the following two
decades.47
Professor Shropshire's laudable historical account aptly describes America's
schizophrenic attitude towards black athletes. As one writer concluded, this dual
existence for black athletes-"both scorned and loved"-represents "a microcosm
of the contradictions of a segregated society.
' 48
Early on Professor Shropshire warns readers that he does not intend to provide
an exhaustive historical account of blacks in American sports.49 Rather his intent is
to provide a brief overview to facilitate the placement of racism's present day
manifestations in sports in historical perspective t However, since he chose not to
include a more in-depth historical analysis, Professor Shropshire's book does not
acquaint readers with more of the parallels between the plight of blacks in sports and
in society at large. For example, more detailed analysis could have included addi-
tional discussion of the confluence of social, economic, and political pressures that
resulted in the segregation of sports.5' As noted by another scholar in the area, the
initial deterioration of black rights was illustrated by the southern codes passed
43. David K. Wiggins, Critical Events Affecting Racism in Athletics, in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS:
THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ATHLETE'S EXPERIENCE, supra note 13, at 2, 5.
44. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1. at 31.
45. Id. at 29-31.
46. Id. at 29.
47. Wiggins, supra note 43, at 34.
48. Donald Spivey, The Black Athlete in Big-Time Intercollegiate Sports, 1941-1968,44 PHYLON 116, 116-
17(1983).
49. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 17.
50. Id.
51. A historical perspective is important inasmuch as racism as it currently exists can only be interpreted
in light of the historical experience of the subordinated. See George A. Martinez, Legal Indeterminacy, Judicial
Discretion and the Mexican-American Litigation Experience: 1930-1980, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 555, 557-58
(1994) (noting that critical race theorists recognize the importance of reinterpreting history).
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shortly after the Civil War.52 This deterioration was furthered by United States
Supreme Court decisions-most notably Plessy v. Ferguson.53 These decisions
coincided with commonly propagated beliefs regarding the inferiority of blacks to
whites.' Consequently, blacks' exclusion from sports mirrored their exclusion from
a broader spectrum of American life.
55
A confluence of social, political, and economic variables also resulted in the
integration of professional sports and broader American society. Significant among
these variables are: (1) Expectations for desegregation created by the "democratic
idealism spawned by World War II,,56 (2) opportunities created by a shortage of
players due to World War II's decimation of the talent pool of white athletes,57 (3)
political activism by blacks and their white allies demanding the desegregation of
professionals sports,58 (4) Supreme Court desegregation decisions, 59 and (5) enact-
ment of federal civil rights legislation.'
Building on his theoretical premise, Professor Shropshire also subtly suggests
an interest convergence analysis of sports. He concludes that economics was key
among the multiple factors that led white owners to integrate their sports teams. 61 He
stops short, however, of specifically using or defining the concept. This omission
creates ambiguity as to the primary factors that influenced the integration of sports.
More explicit reference to the concept would have provided additional opportunity
for Professor Shropshire to elaborate on the critical race methodology for analyzing
racism in sports.
With respect to this concept, the interest convergence principle provides that the
"interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interests of whites."62 In this regard, Professor Shropshire shares
the view of other commentators regarding the principal factors leading to the
integration of American sports.63 In discussing the reasons that led to the integration
of baseball, Professor Harry Edwards wrote: "Quite simply, the color ban in pro-
52. Wiggins, supra note 43, at 25-26.
53. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54. Wiggins, supra note 43, at 26.
55. Id.
56. Edwards, supra note 3, at 92.
57. Id. at 91. Although World War II decimated the talent pool for white players, the talent pool for black
players thrived. This was due in large part to the exclusion of blacks from some military branches and their
relegation to noncombat roles in most instances. Id.
58. Id. at 92; Othello Harris, African-American Predominance in Collegiate Sport, in RACISM IN COLLEGE
ATHLEnTCS: THE AFRICAN-AMERICAN ATHLETE'S EXPERIENCE, supra note 13, at 57, 57-58.
59. Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 636.
60. Edwards, supra note 3, at 93-94. In addition, technological advancements-most notably television and
its potential for turning sports into mass entertainment-contributed to the desegregation of sports. Id. at 94.
61. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 30.
62. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
63. See Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 635 (making a case for the interest convergence
theory in the context of college sports).
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fessional baseball locker rooms was lifted more as a result of Major League
Baseball's Achilles's wallet than its conscience." 64 Professor Edwards holds similar
views with regard to the integration of professional football. "The precipitating
factors [behind desegregation] were the prospects of financial gain, combined with
black and white liberal protest efforts." 65
Professor Shropshire is not quixotic in assessing the ramifications of the racial
integration of American sports. Although he acknowledges that conditions have
improved for blacks in American sports, Professor Shropshire cautions readers that
"racism is ingrained in the sports culture."66 He adds that "[a]lthough the racial per-
centages of those on the playing fields have changed over time and the formal and
most of the informal agreements against discrimination have disappeared on the
field, racism is prevalent in the front office." 67 A point made by Derrick Bell seems
applicable here: "What appears to be progress toward racial justice is, in fact, a
cyclical process. Barriers are lowered in one era only to reveal a new set of often
more sophisticated but no less effective policies that maintain blacks in a subordinate
status.
68
Addressing the reasoning for the lingering presence of racism in sports, Professor
Shropshire concludes that stereotypes from the past are "largely responsible for
African-American exclusion from power positions today. ' 69 He notes that high-level
management of sports teams have adopted the beliefs and fears associated with black
intellectual inferiority that resonate in statements made by Al Campanis, Jimmy "The
Greek" Snyder,70 and Marge Schott. These beliefs assume that the athletic success
of the black athlete is attributable to innate physical skills rather than hard work and
intellect.7 ' As one commentator noted:
African-Americans are thought to possess natural athletic ability in speed,
quickness, and jumping ability, traits that many coaches believe cannot be
taught; you are either born with these qualities or you do without them. That
64. Edwards, supra note 3, at 92.
65. Id.
66. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 32-33.
67. Id. Another commentator notes: "The outcome of this advancement process has been the evolution of
a plantation system of black-white status and authority relations in both sports and society accomplished through
a shift from the black collective exclusion and subordination of segregation to the black selective inclusion and
subordination of radical integration." Edwards, supra note 3, at 85.
68. DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 8 (3d ed. 1993).
69. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 26.
70. Jimmy "The Greek" Snyder caused an uproar when he posited that "the black is the better athlete to
begin with because he's been bred to be that way because of his thigh size and big size. [They] jump higher and
run faster.... All the players are black; the only thing that whites control is the coaching jobs." Id. at 23.
71. Wiggins, supra note 43, at 42. According to Professor Wiggins, such beliefs are tied to myths that "black
athletes, like other members of the black community, are either docile, savage, deceptive, childlike, oversexed, or
a combination of all of the above." Id.
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they excel in sport, then has little to do with their work ethics or their
intellect, according to this perspective.72
Consistent with these ideas, Professor Shropshire proposes that the failure of
blacks to achieve full equality results from the unconscious racism that comes with
the "internalization of stereotypes concerning black athletes' physical superiority
depicted above. 73 Furthermore, Professor Shropshire alleges that although these
derogatory images are more subtle because they are often repressed within the white
consciousness, they still persist today. 74 He relies on a series of well-known incidents
to support this premise. For example, Al Campanis's comments, that "I truly believe
that [blacks] may not have some of the necessities to be, let's say, a field manager
or perhaps a general manager,"'75 is used to illustrate the harmful consequences of
stereotypes regarding the black athlete's athletic superiority yet intellectual
inferiority.76 In Black and White attributes the views expressed by Campanis and
others to deeply held unconscious beliefs and not overt racism. Thus Professor
Shropshire writes:
Campanis was confirming what seemed to be otherwise unverifiable:
that racism permeated sports. The Dodgers executive was simply stating
what he believed the world knew as a fact. Like many who profess to
conduct business in a color-blind manner, Campanis exhibited some deeply
held beliefs. In his initial words, and the words of those who spoke for him
after the fact, there was no racial ill will intended. This was just what he
believed to be true.
77
72. Harris, supra note 58, at 61. Professor Harris adds that "[t]his view allows African-Americans to be
outstanding athletes without negating the belief that they are lazy and ignorant; in fact, it reinforces the belief in
their indolence and incognizance." Id.
Belief in and expressions of these stereotypes are simply not vestiges of the distant past but continue to be
reinforced. For instance, the debate concerning whether black predominance in athletics was attributable to
physiological characteristics has appeared throughout the twentieth century despite their having been discredited
in scientific literature. See EDWARDS, supra note 7, at 193-200 (discussing the mythology of race-linked
characteristics attributed to the black athlete's success); Donnelly, supra note 8, at 227-28 (noting the same); Earl
Smith, The Self Fulfilling Prophecy: Genetically Superior African American Athletes, 21 HUMBOLDT J. SOC. REL.
139 (1995) (discussing the same); Wiggins, supra note 43, at 42 (noting that scientific studies do not support such
views).
Even today one can find expressions of the belief in the genetic superiority of the black athlete even though
they have been refuted. In addition, the media continues to reinforce images of black athletes that feed these
stereotypes. For a detailed discussion of the media's role in perpetuating derogatory images of African-American
athletes, see Davis, supra note 10, at 648-50.
73. Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 644.
74. SHROPSHIRE, supra note I, at 21.
75. Id.
76. See Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 643-50 (discussing these beliefs).
77. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 22.
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While instructive, Professor Shropshire's discussion of the impact of stereotypes
on decisionmaking in hiring is perhaps too general and understated. More specific
and forceful references to the nature of the derogatory stereotypes regarding African-
American athletes would have been beneficial. 8 First, it would have enlightened
readers of the extent to which these false images nurture the unconscious racism that
have denied African-Americans opportunities throughout the history of American
sports.79 In addition, the absence of a detailed discussion of stereotypes denies
Professor Shropshire an opportunity to integrate into his book the theme of the
deleterious effect of unconscious racism.
80
Nevertheless, in concluding the chapter, Professor Shropshire emphasizes that
subconscious racism fed by stereotypes limits opportunities in sports for African-
Americans. He asserts that recognition of this is important to "provide a proper
perspective for seeking prescriptions" for the present day realities of racial
discrimination in sports.8t Professor Shropshire adds that achieving racial equity in
sports will be impeded by beliefs that African-Americans' gains translate into a cor-
responding loss of power by whites.82
In sports what must be sacrificed is the right of whites, primarily white men,
to appoint top-level management positions and sell franchises to their white
friends.... The sacrifice is not so much giving up one's own job as it is
giving up the power to give a job to someone else.83
He adds that "[a]ll of the parties need to remove their color blinders and recognize
the harm of discrimination and the positive value that diversity brings." 4 Such
recognitions will be difficult given a point Professor Shropshire makes earlier in his
book: racial equality in sports will be hampered by differing perceptions of white and
black Americans regarding racism and the extent to which they deny African-
Americans equality in sports.85
78. See Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 643-50 (detailing the fraudulent images that have
been assigned to African-American athletes).
79. For thorough discussions of the historical significance of racial stereotypes on black athletes'
experiences, see the following: EDWARDS, supra note 7; Wiggins, supra note 43; and Davis, Myth of the
Superspade, supra note 10.
80. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
81. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 33.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 9.
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IV. FRANCHISE OWNERSHIP AND RACIAL DIVERSITY
Having shared with readers his historical and theoretical framework, Professor
Shropshire turns to the core of In Black and White: three chapters in which he dis-
cusses the absence of African-Americans in power positions in professional sports.
In the chapter entitled "Sitting in with the 'Good Old Boys': Ownership," Professor
Shropshire addresses the absence of black ownership of professional sports
franchises and the role of the law in achieving greater diversity. He relies on
statistical evidence to paint a stark picture: the virtual absence of diversity among the
ownership elite of professional sports. He notes that blacks accounted for only seven
of the 275 individuals with ownership interests in professional baseball, football, and
basketball in 199406 This disappointing figure is augmented by the fact that none of
these seven possessed a controlling ownership interest in a professional sports fran-
chise. 7
Professor Shropshire provides this information in support of his contention that
despite African-Americans' distributive equality on the playing field, "equality, equal
achievement has not occurred in terms of success at the highest levels., 88 A pro-
ponent of affirmative efforts to achieve racial diversity, Professor Shropshire believes
that such underrepresentation is problematic. However, he candidly acknowledges
the difficulty in assessing the specific benefits that might accrue to professional
sports from black ownership given the lack of actual experience.8 9 In this regard he
states that "while some of the social values of diversity are real, others are difficult
or even impossible to validate." 9 Indeed, the difficulty in assessing foreseeable
consequences-namely, benefits and harms-is a practical problem confronting any
efforts aimed at increasing racial diversity. 9' Nevertheless, having recognized this
issue, Professor Shropshire still explores the likely consequences of increased black
ownership in sports.
The linchpin of Professor Shropshire's call for greater racial diversity in pro-
fessional sports ownership is based upon what he perceives as the positive values that
diversity promotes. Before examining these values, however, I will briefly consider
the economic benefits that Professor Shropshire argues may result from increased
minority presence in sports-franchise ownership. In this regard, he begins by noting
that low African-American attendance at sporting events provides a convenient
86. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 36.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 46.
90. Id. at 37.
91. See MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION & JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL & CONSTITUTIONAL
INQUIRY 95 (1991) (noting that the inability to assess likely outcomes represents a fundamental frustration for
proponents of utilitarian justifications for affirmative action efforts); Shelia Foster, Difference and Equality: A
Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. REV. 105, 113 (noting that forward looking rather
than remedial justification for affirmative action policies are criticized as "too vague to be compelling").
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economic rationale for owners who seek to justify paying African-American athletes,
on average, lower salaries than white athletes.92 According to Professor Shropshire,
racial diversity in ownership would, at a minimum, eliminate perceptions of a racial
component to salary decisions. 93 He further presumes that African-American owners
would ignore any attendance statistics in making salary determinations or would
initiate the changes needed to attract black fans.94 Thus, he surmises that this
economic argument for salary discrimination could be eradicated.95 He astutely con-
cludes, however, the dearth of "instances of modem-day African-American sports-
franchise ownership to verify that greater equity will actually arrive with diversity."
96
Professor Shropshire next turns his attention to other race-related inequities in
professional sports resulting from a lack of diversity. Conceivably these too could
be impacted by increased minority ownership. To begin, relying on studies from
other industries, Professor Shropshire contends that black ownership would in fact
increase the likelihood that African-Americans would be hired for management level
positions.97 In addition, he refers to studies that reveal that the market value of
companies increase with diversity. This particular assertion is specifically intended
to address concerns that the quality of sports would decline under black ownership.98
At this juncture, Professor Shropshire should have informed the readers of the
relationship between these concerns and images regarding African-Americans in
sports.99 By not doing so, he once again forgoes an opportunity to highlight an impor-
tant aspect-the influence of negative stereotypes--of his theoretical premises.
Professor Shropshire attempts to support his suppositions by drawing on the few
instances of black ownership of professional sports franchises. He cites to black
ownership of Negro League baseball teams and the minority interest held by African-
Americans in the NBA's Denver Nuggets.1°° Of the illustrations provided by
Professor Shropshire, one provides minimal support for his views concerning the
possible positive impact minority ownership might have on increasing the hiring of
African-Americans. The Savannah Cardinals, a minor league baseball franchise, had
minority owners from 1985 to 1987. He emphasizes that during this period, the
management of the Cardinals was predominantly African-American.10 l Ultimately,
Professor Shropshire concedes that "[wihat is missing is a long-term experience in
92. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 43-44.




97. !d. at 45-46.
98. Id.
99. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
100. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 46-48.
101. Id. at 46.
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integrated sports ownership to test" whether minority ownership enhances chances
of "meritocratic employment for African-Americans in professional sports."'0'
Notwithstanding his discussion of the financial implications that would likely
result from diversity in sports-franchise ownership, the reader senses that Professor
Shropshire relies most substantially on the social benefits of diversity in calling for
change.103 Drawing on events outside the realm of sports and personal experiences,
Professor Shropshire emphasizes what he characterizes as the "actual value of
diversity." One such value is the consciousness raising potential of racial diversity.
He summarizes his views in this regard as follows:
Once diversity is introduced into any setting, those accustomed to a
monochromatic institution must change. Both blatant and unconscious acts
of racism are more likely to be addressed by a diverse group. People of
diverse backgrounds generally will provide a varied perspective and
encourage more thoughtful viewpoints from others.'0
Professor Shropshire next discusses what he denotes as the "perceived value of
diversity," presumably the benefits of diversity that are more difficult to assess.105 He
points out that persons of color in positions of leadership enhance both the perception
and the likelihood that blacks and other minorities will receive equitable treatment.t16
In reaching this conclusion, he gently suggests that blacks in positions of authority
will be better equipped to overcoming the unconscious stereotypes that impede
opportunity and advancement for minorities."0 7 Professor Shropshire also believes
that diversity adds an element of racial sensitivity in decisionmaking. 08
Several themes appear within Professor Shropshire's discussion of the social
benefits of diversity. Implicit in his analysis is the controversial theme of critical race
theory, which posits that African-Americans and other people of color have life
experiences that give them a dual consciousness." This, in turn, produces a racially
102. Id.
103. This sense is confirmed later in ihz Black and White when Professor Shropshire concludes that the social
benefits of diversity present the strongest arguments in support of increased minority ownership in sports. Id. at 61.
104. Id. at 39.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 36, 41.
107. Id. at 40-41.
108. Id.
109. Professor Barnes offers the following quotation from W.E.B. DuBois to describe the theory of dual
consciousness:
After the Egyptian and Indian, the Greek and Roman, the Teuton and Mongolian, the Negro is a sort
of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this American world,--a world which
yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other
world. It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self
through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused
contempt and pity. One ever feels his twoness,--an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two
unreconciled strivings, two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from
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distinctive voice."' Moreover, on the notion of a racially distinctive voice and
perspective,'1 ' Professor Robin Barnes states:
Critical race scholars recognize that the unique perspective of many minority
scholars has developed from their experience and progress in the face of
racially invidious treatment and from their empathy with the physical and
psychological conditions of those who have been marginalized.... Social-
political reality can be understood only if a plurality of voices articulates
different point[s] of view; understanding suffers when some voices are
silenced. Minority scholars are uniquely positioned to assist in the goal of
breaking this silence.'
2
Professor Shropshire apparently shares such sentiments in arguing that increased
diversity in ownership will open the way for people with different perspectives to
address the issues, including race, that confront sports. From my perspective, he
could have bolstered the race consciousness thread of his theoretical framework by
expressly addressing the notion of a racially distinctive voice. Such a discussion
would have also provided a point of departure for examining the debate--even
among scholars of color-regarding the merits of diversity."3 This, in turn, would
have better informed and enabled readers to evaluate Professor Shropshire's un-
qualified endorsement of increased diversity in sports-franchise ownership.
Professor Shropshire's social values arguments in favor of diversity parallel
arguments advanced to justify affirmative action programs in education and in broad-
being torn asunder.
Robin D. Barnes, Race Consciousness: The Thematic Content of Racial Distinctiveness in Critical Race
Scholarship, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1864. 1866 (1990) (quoting W.E.B. DuBOis, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 3
(1903)).
110. Id. at 1865-66.
111. Commenting on this racially distinctive voice, Professor Calmore states:
Although the world of black Americans since slavery has been an integral part of American society, the
worlds of blacks and whites have been intensely separate. Inevitably, this has resulted in distinctive
histories and features of African-American culture, institutions, and society. It is, therefore, no surprise
that blacks and whites so often see quite different realities at both the perceptual and experiential levels.
Calmore, supra note 17, at 2144.
112. Barnes, supra note 109, at 1869-70. Professor Barnes adds that the notion of a dual consciousness that
imbues people of color with a "minority voice" has been severely criticized. Professor Randall Kennedy warns that
the idea of a minority voice risks essentialism. He adds that "racial groups are not monolithic." He concludes that
ignoring the diversity of experiences of minorities does them a disservice in their quest for equality. See Randall
L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of LegalAcademia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1782-83 (1989). But see Foster, supra
note 91, at 141 (proposing that the tension between diversity and essentialism can be resolved by acknowledging
that the value of diversity lies both in diverse viewpoints contributed by those from different backgrounds and the
inclusion of those systematically disempowered).
113. See, e.g., Spencer A. Overton, The Threat Diversity Poses to African Americans: A Black Nationalist
Critique of Outsider Ideology, 37 HOW. L. 465,488 (1994) (arguing that "[bilacks should reject diversity because
it promotes the use of victimization as a rationale to gain entry into majoritarian society").
1997/Racial Discrimination in Sports
casting. After discussing the relevant cases, he assesses whether existing precedent
can compel greater African-American sports-franchise ownership.
Professor Shropshire's review of case law begins with the landmark case Regents
of the University of California v. Bakke,"14 in which the Supreme Court addressed the
significance of diversity in the context of university admissions programs. Justice
Powell, writing alone, concluded that the University of California at Davis's race
conscious dual admissions policy was unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny stan-
dard of review.'t 5 In reaching this conclusion, however, Justice Powell conceded that
diversity was a compelling governmental interest in the context of university
admissions programs." 6 In support of his position, Justice Powell attributed special
significance to diversity in the higher education context because of the intimate
experiences, varying outlooks, and the "robust exchange of ideas" that are essential
to the quality of higher education."17 He added that the "atmosphere of 'speculation,
experiment and creation'-so essential to the quality of higher education-is widely
believed to be promoted by a diverse student body."" 8
The Supreme Court examined the importance of diversity within the broad-
casting industry in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC.'"9 The Court held that the
FCC's program seeking to enhance minority ownership within the broadcasting
industry did not violate the Constitution under the intermediate scrutiny standard of
review. t2' In so holding, the Court stated, "[the] broadcasting industry with repre-
sentative minority participation will produce more variation and diversity than will
one whose ownership is drawn from a single racially and ethnically homogenous
group."' 2' It concluded that "the interest in enhancing broadcasting diversity is, at the
very least, an 'important' governmental objective." The Court also found the impor-
tance of diversity of views and information over the airwaves analogous to that of the
robust exchange of information and ideas in the university setting.
Recently, in Hopwood v. State of Texas,' 3 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit revisited the issue of diversity in the context of higher education.
A three-judge panel decided that consideration of race or ethnicity by the University
114. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
115. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
116. Id. at313-14.
117. Id. at 313.
118. Id. at 312.
119. 497 U.S. 547 (1990), overruled in part by Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
120. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 564-66.
121. Id. at 579.
122. Id. at 568. Metro Broadcasting has been overruled to the extent that it required an intermediate level
of scrutiny for federal affirmative action programs. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2013 (1995);
Patricia M. Worthy, Diversity and Minority Stereotyping in the Television Media: The Unsettled First Amendment
Issue, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & EN. L.J. 509, 529 (1996); see infra note 126 (discussing the vitality of Metro
Broadcasting in the aftermath of Adarand).
123. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc'y v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct.
2580 (1996).
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of Texas Law School for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a
compelling interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.' 24 The court argued that
Justice Powell's view in Bakke was not binding precedent because he failed to repre-
sent a majority of the Court on the issue of diversity as a compelling governmental
interest."25
Obviously, the Supreme Court will have the final say on the question of racial
diversity in the educational setting. Nonetheless, Hopwood seriously clouds the ques-
tion of the constitutionality of employing race conscious affirmative action initiatives
premised on promoting diversity. 26 Even without the benefit of the Hopwood
decision, Professor Shropshire acknowledges that making a case for diversity as a
compelling governmental interest in the context of professional sports ownership will
be difficult. 27 Nevertheless, he stops short of conceding the point.
Relying on the principles expressed in Metro Broadcasting, Professor Shropshire
suggests that professional sports, if viewed as a form of entertainment, may have
societal impact similar to that of the broadcasting industry, and may derive similar
benefits from diversity in franchise ownership. 12 1n support of his position, Professor
Shropshire argues that the message conveyed by professional sports is either com-
municated by the images on the field or by the images of the people in charge of the
sports industry, presumably owners. 29 He asserts that:
[Yjouth who see[] only whites as owners, officials, and quarterbacks gain[]
an understanding of who the leaders are in society, as well as of who the
leaders are not. This reinforces both the conscious and unconscious beliefs
regarding race held by all who watch. This message delivered by sports
franchises-that is, who occupies leadership roles-is determined in large
part by the owners. 30
124. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 943.
125. Id.
126. Such uncertainty is heightened given the Supreme Court's holding in Adarand Constructors, to the effect
that all race conscious affirmative action policies are unconstitutional unless the policy is "narrowly tailored" to
further a "compelling governmental interest." Adarand Constructors, 115 S. Ct. at 2113. Thus after years of debate
concerning the appropriate standard of review of race conscious affirmative action policies, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that, "all racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local governmental actor, [whether
benign or invidious], must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny." Id. It should be noted that, in
dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's opinion in Adarand did not diminish the important interest of
fostering diversity that was recognized in Metro Broadcasting. Id. at 2127 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Supreme
Court's holding in Adarand has unequivocally answered the question concerning the proper standard of review to
be applied in race conscious affirmative action programs; however, the question remains whether "diversity" is a
compelling governmental interest.
127. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 51.
128. Id. at 50.
129. Id. at51.
130. Id. at 50-51.
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Professor Shropshire adds, however, that regardless of the positive message that
could be conveyed by greater visible diversity in sports, it is not on the order of the
congressionally recognized interest the Court sought to protect in Metro Broad-
casting.'3 This is especially true given the tendency discussed above to trivialize the
significance of sports in our society.1t 2 Professor Shropshire's sports-broadcasting
analogy will be all the more difficult for courts to accept since television audiences
rarely see owners. Clearly what audiences see is disproportionately high numbers of
African-Americans playing high profile sports. As discussed above, these large
numbers in the player ranks, in turn, create the perception that African-Americans
have achieved equality and that opportunities abound in the world of sports. 133 This
latter message, while facially positive, is particularly harmful to African-American
youth.' 34 In short, it is arguable that the images depicted in the sports of basketball
and football, at least with respect to the issue of franchise ownership, indirectly
undercut the underrepresentation of minorities in television that disturbed the Metro
Broadcasting Court.
35
In summary, given the current status of the law regarding affirmative action, the
argument that diversity in sports ownership is a compelling governmental interest is
a difficult one to make. To his credit, Professor Shropshire cautions readers regarding
the difficulties of equating the significance of diversity in sports ownership with that
of broadcasting or higher education from a legal standpoint.,36 Having done so, he
next considers antidiscrimination laws as a vehicle for increasing diversity in the
ownership ranks of sports franchises.
Turning to Title VII,' 37 Professor Shropshire concludes that this legislation holds
little promise as a basis for judicially mandating diversity in ownership. 3 He begins
by appropriately pointing out that it is the employment relationship that invokes the
application of Title VII 39 No such relationship exists between owners and pro-
spective owners or between sports leagues and prospective owners. Although
131. Id. at 51.
132. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
134. See SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 145-46 (discussing the harmful consequences in the African-American
community of the emphasis on sports as a vehicle for upward mobility); Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note
10, at 650-51 (discussing the same).
135. See generally Worthy, supra note 122 (discussing diversity in broadcasting).
136. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 51.
137. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
2000e-2017 (West 1994).
138. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1. at 53-54.
139. Id. In support, Professor Shropshire quotes as follows from a leading case: "The contractual relationship
of employment triggers the provisions of Title VII governing 'terms, condition, or privileges of employment."' Id.
at 176 (quoting Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984)) see I MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT
LAW 154 (1994) (noting that to invoke Title VII the "relationship between the complainant and the respondent must
be one of "employment").
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partnership decisions are not immune to Title VII, uncertain legal precedent,"4
freedom of association concerns, 14 1 and judicial deference to subjective criteria
142
further circumscribe its applicability to franchise ownership.'43 Likewise, Professor
Shropshire places little faith in 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 as a legal mechanism for increa-
sing minority ownership. I consider these antidiscrimination norms more fully in the
discussion, which follows, regarding racial inequities in hiring high-level employees.
In concluding his discussion of diversity in ownership, Professor Shropshire
suggests that voluntary rather than court-imposed efforts represent a better approach
to diversifying ownership of sports teams. He argues that this will depend on recog-
nition by players, owners, and league commissioners and leaders of the benefits that
sports can derive from racial diversity. 44 In this regard, he suggests a special role for
league commissioners such as David Stem. 41 Professor Shropshire asserts that they
can be proactive in attempts to include minority owners in expansion deals.
46
Similarly, he assigns a special role for African-American athletes who may have the
interest and financial wherewithal to gain an ownership interest in a sports team. 47
He stops short, however, of proposing some of the more radical forms of action by
African-American athletes suggested by certain commentators. 48
Ultimately, however, Professor Shropshire concludes that franchise owners are
the key to effectuating change. While he applauds recent efforts to include African-
Americans within the ownership groups in recent NFL expansion teams, he wisely
cautions against becoming overly optimistic. 149 Instilling within owners the desire to
promote diversity is a daunting task given that "owners suffer from the same levels
of conscious and unconscious racism as are present in the rest of society. ' '50 This
may particularly be the case if one believes that change will only come about if
owners perceive it is within their economic interests to do so.
V. INTEGRATING THE FRONT OFFICE
In Chapter Three, entitled "The Front Office and Antidiscrimination Law,"
Professor Shropshire briefly examines existing antidiscrimination law as a means of
recourse for increasing the African-American presence in sports management. Based
140. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 233 (1989), superseded in part by the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2); Hishon v.
King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
141. See Hishon, 467 U.S. at 77.
142. See Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 729 F.2d 85,93 (2d Cir. 1984).
143. See Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
144. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 58-59.
145. Id. at 58.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 61.
148. See generally Edwards, supra note 3.
149. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 58, 60.
150. Id. at 60.
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upon his review of key statutes (Title VII and § 1981) and cases, Professor
Shropshire views the law as an ineffective vehicle for achieving this objective.
My review of the pertinent statutory and case law finds me in agreement with
Professor Shropshire's conclusion. I begin with the statute that Professor Shropshire
considers potentially most significant. Title VII of the amended Civil Rights Act of
1964 makes it unlawful to fail or to refuse to hire individuals on account of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.' The thrust of Title VII prohibits employers
from discriminating against any individual with respect to that individual's com-
pensation, or privileges of employment.
52
The most common type of Title VII claim is for disparate treatment, when a
plaintiff alleges that the worker has been treated less favorably than the worker's
peers on account of race. To prevail on such a claim, the plaintiff must prove dis-
criminatory purpose on the part of the employer. 5 3 Thus, the key to proving disparate
treatment is intent to discriminate.54
To prevail on a Title VII disparate treatment claim, a prospective African-
American coach or executive would be required to prove that the motivation behind
an owner's decision not to promote the coach or executive was made with a dis-
criminatory intent. However, as Professor Shropshire points out, the manner in which
hiring decisions are made in professional sports creates impediments to producing
such evidence. As he appropriately notes, given that race on a conscious level typi-
cally is not a factor in hiring decisions, when a sports franchise owner hires a family
member or a friend, the odds are against establishing a Title VII disparate treatment
claim.
155
These features of sports hiring create potentially insurmountable evidentiary
barriers to sustaining a disparate impact claim under Title VII. In Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,t56 the Supreme Court held that Title VII, in addition to banning inten-
tional discrimination, also bans neutral employment practices that have a disparate
impact on blacks, unless those practices are shown to be justified by business
necessity. 57 In this regard, the Court stated that facially neutral practices that
"operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
151. Title VII renders it unlawful "for an employer.., to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) (West 1994).
152. ABIGAIL COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 2.01-.22 (3d ed. 1993).
153. Id. § 1.09, 1.10.
154. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,510-11 (1993); Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co.,
26 F.3d 1277, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994).
155. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 66; see Robert E. Suggs, Racial Discrimtination in Business Transactions.
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1257, 1275-76 (1991) (noting, in the context of Title VII, that only in cases of extreme
discrimination can a plaintiff show the requisite intent to discriminate short of an admission of culpability by the
defendant).
156. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
157. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
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job capability" violate Title VII regardless of the employer's good intent or lack of
discriminatory intent.'
58
In prevailing on these types of cases, plaintiffs must establish by statistics that
the practice at issue results in a substantially disproportionate underrepresentation of
statutorily protected persons. 59 However, they cannot sustain an action simply by
proving the existence of a racial or other imbalance in the employer's work force.'
60
A disparate impact claimant must also demonstrate that this imbalance was caused
by a specific discriminatory practice and "that each challenged employment practice
causes a disparate impact."' t6 The most viable suits in this area are those brought by
a party denied ajob opportunity based on a discriminatory selection device or hiring
practice.
Professor Shropshire reiterates his earlier point that in making hiring decisions
in sports, employers typically will not use a selection device or specific hiring
practice.' 62 In this regard, he notes a recent NAACP study that revealed an absence
of hiring or promotion practices in sports that amount to disparate impact or
treatment. 63 Professor Shropshire concludes:
Employers in sports tend to use a series of subjective criteria, varying among
employment decisions, with no elements necessarily being weighed more
heavily than others. With no unique practice to target as discriminatory, it
is difficult to bring an action under Title VII no matter what the statistics
show regarding the underrepresentation of any group at any job level.'
64
158. Id. at 432. The Court further stated as follows:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.
Id. at 429-30.
159. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988).
160. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989), superseded in part by the Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-75 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
161. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i) (West 1994); Atonio, 490 U.S. at 645; Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.,
965 F.2d 1363, 1367 (5th Cir. 1992).
The burden of proof in disparate impact cases is described as follows:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is established under this title only if (i) a
complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that causes a
disparate impact... and the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity; or (ii) the complaining party makes
the demonstration described in paragraph (C) with respect to an alternative employment practice and
the respondent refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (West 1994).
162. SHROPSHIRE, supra note I, at 65-66.
163. Id. at 65; Telephone Interview with Newton Jackson, Consultant, NAACP (Jan. 15, 1995) (notes on file
with the author).
164. SHROPSHIRE., supra note 1, at 65.
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I agree with Professor Shropshire's conclusion that the absence of objectively
quantifiable factors on which employment decisions are made will pose difficulties
for African-Americans who challenge hiring* and promotion decisions in sports.
Similarly, I concur with his conclusion that such challenges will likely be unsuc-
cessful inasmuch as courts-which presume to lack the requisite expertise-"are
reluctant to second-guess the validity of such subjective criteria.'
165
Professor Shropshire appropriately points out, however, that the use of subjective
criteria will not provide an absolute shield against a Title VII disparate impact
claim.166 The Supreme Court has held that subjective criteria, under which employers
or their agents have substantial discretion in identifying desired traits or charac-
teristics, are subject to disparate impact theory. 67 Once again, however, plaintiffs are
confronted with a formidable obstacle: establishing the requisite relationship between
particular subjective employment practices and disparities in the work force.1' Given
these evidentiary requirements, African-Americans are likely to find that disparate
impact theory offers little recourse as a basis for challenging employment practices
in sports.
I also agree with Professor Shropshire's conclusion that a plaintiff seeking a
position in sports management is not likely to encounter greater success pursuing a
§ 1981 action. 69 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in the con-
tracting process." 0 Like Title VII disparate treatment cases, § 1981 proscribes only
intentional acts of racial discrimination.17' Given the nature of the hiring process that
occurs in professional sports, as Professor Shropshire observes, absent the "rare
'smoking gun' event, where the employer says, for example, 'We don't want to hire
you because you are black,"' prevailing on a § 1981 claim is unlikely to occur.
72
Given his philosophical premises, Professor Shropshire's analysis of the utility
of antidiscrimination norms is surprisingly doctrinal. The limited usefulness of
traditional antidiscrimination laws in the context of sports hiring provided Professor
Shropshire with an occasion to explore another strand of his theoretical framework:
165. Id. at 67.
166. Id. at 68.
167. Watson, 487 U.S. at 989-90.
168. See, e.g., Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 965 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir. 1992); Lowe v. Commack Union Free
Seh. Dist., 886 F.2d 1364 (2d Cir. 1989).
169. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 54.
170. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981 (West Supp. 1994). Prior to 1991, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected decades of
contrary precedent in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 176-78 (1989), superseded by the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981), by
narrowly interpreting the scope of § 1981 as applying to the initial formation and the enforcement stages of a
contract only. Thus, discrimination that involved contractual performance was held to fall outside the strictures of
the statute. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 states, in part, as follows: "the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes
the making, performance, modification, and termination of contricts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981(b) (West Supp. 1994).
171. Id.; see, e.g., Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 839-40 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting only intentional
discrimination may violate § 1981); Edwards v. Jewish Hosp., 855 F.2d 1345, 1349 (8th Cir. 1988) (same).
172. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 64.
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the need to "unmask themes that dominate mainstream legal discourse."' 73 Indeed,
African-Americans' inability to rely on established antidiscrimination laws to
achieve racial justice illustrates the limitations inherent in an antidiscrimination legal
framework that fails to take into account unconscious racism. 74 For example, in
urging that the equal protection doctrine come to grips with unconscious racism, 7
Professor Charles Lawrence commented that:
[t]raditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about
racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized
as neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-
consciously sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes are
random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires,
and wishes.
76
By more fully elaborating, Professor Shropshire would have done readers a service.
He would have equipped them with yet another lens through which they could view
the limited role of antidiscrimination norms in sports.
VI. DISCRIMINATION IN THE FRONT OFFICE
In Chapter Four, entitled "Fear of a Black Planet: The Front Office and Antidis-
crimination Law," Professor Shropshire again turns to statistics that demonstrate the
consistent under-representation of African-Americans in management and leadership
positions in the three major sports. 7' He condemns this paucity of blacks in
professional sports teams management. According to Professor Shropshire, blacks
desiring management positions find the odds stacked against them.' 78 He notes that
for African-American athletes who desire a career in management following their
playing days, the transition up the sports-business ladder is considerably more
difficult to traverse than for their white counterparts. 79 Using baseball as an example,
Professor Shropshire, voicing the view of other commentators,180 asserts that even
when blacks attain management positions, they often confront enormous odds against
173. Calmore, supra note 17, at 2161-62 & n.107; see supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
174. See Lawrence, supra note 29, at 319; see also Linda S. Green, Race in the 21 Century: Equality Through
Law?, 64 TtL. L. REv. 1515 (1990).
175. Lawrence, supra note 29, at 322-23.
176. Id. at 322.
177. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 78. He does note that the National Basketball Association track record is
better with respect to hiring. Id. at 79.
178. Id. at 77-78.
179. Id. at 77.
180. According to Harry Edwards, blacks, with few exceptions, are "offered the top coaching job principally
with death bed or low profile programs." Edwards, supra note 3, at 100.
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their success.' "Prior to the Campanis event .... the three blacks who were hired
to manage in the major leagues were given garbage teams .... ,,8
Professor Shropshire argues that the inability of African-Americans to break into
leadership is attributable in large part to negative stereotypes.' These stereotypes,
in conjunction with the "good old boy" system of hiring, result in lower numbers of
blacks in authority positions in sports.' 4 Emphasizing the impact of the old boy
network, he quotes a sports executive as follows: "If you're starting off with a
predominantly white male work-force and who they know and who they network
with is predominantly other white males, that's what I think has happened in the
business years ago and even now ... ."'8S Given these dynamics, Professor
Shropshire concludes that "[a]ffirmative action must be taken for more African-
Americans to become a part of these hiring networks.' 6
Having reached this conclusion, the remainder of the chapter is devoted to a
discussion of the merits of enacting affirmative action measures in sports. Attempting
to justify his argument for increased hiring of blacks in front office positions,
Professor Shropshire notes the applicability of the values associated with diversity
in the context of franchise ownership.8 7 He adds, however, that additional reasons
support increasing the numbers of African-Americans in front offices. 8 These
include psychological reasons such as the similarity of experiences. 1 9 He argues that
"the basic point is that a person with similar life experiences, another African-
American, is likely to have a better understanding of the African-American athlete
on a personal level than a white coach."'"
Having established that sufficient justification exists for making race-conscious
hiring decisions in sports, Professor Shropshire concludes that given the nature of
racism in sports, affirmative action strategies must revolve around opening hiring
networks.'9 ' He also offers readers a glimpse of strategies that have been either pro-
posed or instituted to bring African-Americans into the mainstream of the sports
management network. 92 Illustrative of such initiatives is one involving a "group
called the Baseball Network [that] was formed to attempt to inject minorities who
181. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 78-79.
182. Id. at 79.
183. Id. at 78.
184. Id. at 83.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 80.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 80-81.
190. Id. at 81.
191. Id. at 83-84.
192. Id. at 84-90.
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normally would not be a part of the old boys' network into that networking
structure."193
According to Professor Shropshire, such league-sponsored plans tend largely to
be of symbolic value.1 94 He argues they fail to incorporate mechanisms specific
enough to provide a realistic basis for enhancing diversity in power positions 95
Apart from this criticism, Professor Shropshire offers little elaboration on the reasons
underlying the limited utility of such programs. He apparently believes that the suc-
cess of sports-related affirmative action plans is dependent on the commitment of
those in leadership positions, principally owners and officials. 96 "Unlike the owner-
ship level with its problems of financing and the legal protections that protect
clubbiness, much can be done fairly rapidly and with the help of strong leadership
to increase the numbers of African-Americans in front-office management and
coaching positions.1 97
Professor Shropshire clearly views franchise owners and league officials as the
pivotal players in promoting diversity in sports management. For example, he assigns
to them the task of taking steps to rebut negative public sentiment regarding affir-
mative action.'" In this regard, Professor Shropshire states:
To promote affirmative action in sports, the commissioners and owners must
articulate the historical diversity shortcomings of their sport and the fact that
racism is deeply ingrained in the culture of sports. The view of Professor
Charles Lawrence that permanent unconscious racism exists in all of us must
also be conveyed. 199
Similarly, he envisions league officials and owners as taking the lead in responding
to the resistance to affirmative actions programs that stems from fears of quotas and
unfair advantage.2 ° In this regard he notes that "[t]he response from the league and
owners to quota arguments must incorporate the broad benefits of diversity, the
realities of the skills and capabilities of African-Americans, and the cultural history
of the sports industry." 201 At another point he states that "the commissioners of the
respective leagues, as well as the team.owners, must anticipate the resistance to
193. Id. at 87. Similarly. he directs the reader's attention to plans generated by external groups such as Jesse
Jackson's Rainbow Coalition for Fairness in Athletics (RCFA). He notes the RCFA plan that established steps for
increasing diversity in sports was criticized for setting specific numerical goals for hiring African-Americans. Id.
194. Id. at 85.
195. Id. at 85-90.
196. Id. at 90.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 92-94.
199. Id. at 94.
200. Id. at 92.
201. Id. at 93.
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I agree with his conclusions regarding the significant role owners and league
officials must play in increasing diversity in front office and coaching positions in
professional sports. However, perhaps more so than Professor Shropshire, I question
whether these power players are willing to accept the enormous task that Professor
Shropshire asserts they must accept. In mild fashion, Professor Shropshire states,
"Implementing programs and bringing owners on board is a difficult balancing
act."2 3 Notwithstanding these words of caution, he seems to assume a readiness and
willingness on the part of owners and league commissioners to accomplish the tasks
necessary to integrate sports management. In so doing, he departs from a critical
element of his underlying thesis-the pervasive influence of stereotypes and
unconscious racism on the mind set of these decisionmakers.2° Drawing from his
discussion concerning the role of stereotypes made earlier in the chapter would have
established this connection.
Furthermore, an obvious question that arises from Professor Shropshire's
discussion is who or what will sensitize owners and league officials to the merits of
diversity. What will propel owners to want to change? Rather than confront such
issues squarely, Professor Shropshire suggests that external pressure from groups
such as the Rainbow Coalition for Fairness in Athletics may stimulate action by
league officials and owners.20 5 Such external pressure was brought to bear in 1994
when the NAACP threatened a boycott to protest the NFL Dallas Cowboys' minority
hiring and vendor practices. 206 The NAACP charged that although seventy percent
of Cowboys players were black, no blacks held front office positions with the organi-
zation.2°7 In response to these charges, Cowboys owner Jerry Jones "conceded that
there [were] no minorities among the top echelon of the Cowboys management.
' 208
He added, "[T]hat's because the organization is small and all the key managers are
his family members or people who have spent their careers working for him."2o He
later agreed to add three African-American staff positions. Mr. Jones's response re-
flects the complexity of the issue of race in sports. It also demonstrates the
202. Id. at 91.
203. Id. at 96.
204. In another instance, Professor Shropshire seems to minimize the aspect of his theoretical premise that
maintains that unconscious racism creates inaccurate perceptions of the ability of African-Americans in sports to
perform nonathletically related tasks. He states that "the uniqueness of affirmative action in sports is that there so
clearly is no basis for the white societal presumption of African-Americans being less qualified than whites....
This is a question not of lack of merit but rather of a lack of opportunity." Id. at 86.
205. Id. at 89-90.
206. Jessamy Brown, NAACP Threatens Boycott of Dr. Pepper, 7-Up Products, Fr. WORTH STAR TELEGP.AM,
Jan. 31, 1995, at IA.
207. Christopher Lee, NAACP Investigate Cowboys' Hiring: Jones Rejects Criticism About Lack of
Minorities in Top Jobs, DALLAs MORNING NEws, June 2, 1994, at 27A.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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awakening that owners must undergo before they are adequately prepared to assume
the leadership role Professor Shropshire has set aside for them.
In the conclusion to Chapter Four, Professor Shropshire offers insight into some
of the critical factors that may motivate owners to take the lead in diversifying sports.
Returning to the notion of interest convergence, he concludes that the selling of
affirmative action in sports will hinge on making the case that diversity is good for
the business of sports.210 Thus, here Professor Shropshire returns to one of his initial,
over-arching themes-economics will be the critical factor in propelling owners and
league officials to integrate coaching and managerial positions in sports.
VII. RACISM IN COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
In the next two chapters, Professor Shropshire deals with matters that are
important but only peripherally related to the theme of increasing minority ownership
and hiring in professional sports.2t' Consequently, they are briefly considered.
Chapter Five, entitled "Color-Blind Propositions: The Collegiate Ranks,"
explores racism in college athletics. Professor Shropshire begins by identifying the
two primary manifestations of race-related concerns at the collegiate level: the impact
of race on the academic opportunities afforded African-American student-athletes,
and the absence of African-Americans in the power positions of collegiate sports.
212
In this section, Professor Shropshire asserts that the perceived unfairness of
National Collegiate Athletics Association (NCAA) initial eligibility rules illustrates
the racial tensions surrounding the academic experiences of African-American
student-athletes.21 3 As is commonly known, tensions rose to the surface after the
NCAA adopted stricter standards-commonly known as Proposition 48-for
determining the eligibility of prospective first-year student-athletes to receive athletic
scholarships. t4 Professor Shropshire shares with readers the concerns of critics who
210. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 100.
211. This is not intended to suggest the nonexistence of a relationship between what occurs at the collegiate
and professional levels. For example, Professor Shropshire astutely notes that racism in collegiate sports can impact
opportunities for African-Americans at the professional levels. "Playing at the college level may lead to the pros
and opportunities to progress up the sports-business administrative ladder. It also often leads to graduate assistant
positions which in turn may lead to college coaching positions and eventually to positions in the pros." Id. at 106.
212. Id. at 103-05.
213. Id. at 103-04.
214. Enacted in 1983, to take effect in 1986, NCAA regulations commonly known as Proposition 48 required
that a Division I scholarship athlete was eligible to compete during the first year only if the athlete had a score of
700 on the SAT or 17 on the ACT, and at least a 2.0 grade-point average in a core curriculum comprised of eleven
courses, NCAA OPERATING BYLAW, art. 14, § 14.3.1.1(a), (b). in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION,
1995-96 NCAA MANUAL 142-43 (1995). Proposition 48 standards have been superseded by more stringent
requirements known as Proposition 16. These regulations, which went into effect for students entering college after
August 1, 1996, provide that Division I eligibility is to be determined pursuant to an indexed scale requiring that
high school graduates with a 700 SAT score or a 17 ACT score must have at least a 2.5 GPA in a core curriculum
consisting of 13 courses. A prospective Division I student-athlete with a 2.0 GPA would be required to score at least
900 or 21 on the SAT or ACT, respectively, to be eligible to compete and be awarded an athletic scholarship during
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challenged Proposition 48 as racist "not only for the projected negative impact on
African-American enrollment but also for the lack of inclusion of African-Americans
in the original creation of the rule."215 In addition, Professor Shropshire points out
that much of the criticism of Proposition 48 involves the significant extent to which
eligibility standards are based on standardized tests? 16 A common complaint re-




Professor Shropshire concludes his discussion by assessing the role of the law
in achieving racial equality for African-American student-athletes.2 8 Like other
commentators, he believes that with the possible exception of Title VI (and only to
a limited extent), traditional antidiscrimination norms will not provide a realistic
means of accomplishing this goal.29 This is due largely to the proof required to
sustain actions under such statutes.m One commentator notes, "In the intercollegiate
context, where persons of color predominate (at least in the numerical sense),
inequitable treatment is often far more subtle and far less susceptible of proof than
in a traditional discrimination suit."' ' Professor Smith adds that the "intent require-
ment, coupled with the Supreme Court's present unwillingness to permit 'affirmative
action,' makes it unlikely that student-athletes of color will be able to address racial
inequities of the sorts that exist in the intercollegiate athletics context.... through
federal constitutional or related means."2 22 These realities have led Professor
Shropshire and others to recommend a broad range of legal and nonlegal approaches
to combating racial inequities in college sports.223 These approaches include using
common law doctrine, NCAA rule-making, state and federal legislation, and political
action as a means of ameliorating racial inequities in sports.
224
With respect to the underrepresentation of African-Americans in college sports
administration, Professor Shropshire asserts that the lack of diversity "parallels the
problems at the professional level."22s Here too he envisions a very limited role for
law as a vehicle for mandating increased diversity in this setting. Instead, he sees a
the student-athlete's first year of college. NCAA OPERATING BYLAW. art. 14, § 14.3.1.1(a), (b), in NATIONAL
COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION. 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL142-43 (1995).
215. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 108.
216. Id. at 111.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 125.
219. Id.
220. See Smith, supra note 11, at 361-62; see also Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra hote 10, at 681-83
(arguing the same).
221. Smith, supra note 11, at 362; see Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 681-83 (arguing that
the inability of student-athletes to prove intentional racism limits the effectiveness of traditional antidiscrimination
laws in this context).
222. Smith, supra note I1, at 362-63.
223. SHROPSHIRE, supra note I, at 125-27.
224. See Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 695-97; Smith, supra note 11, at 378-79.
225. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 124.
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critical role for college presidents and athletic directors in taking the initiative to
increase diversity at the collegiate level. 26
Professor Shropshire's discussion of initial eligibility rules is related to a larger
concern: To what extent do facially neutral NCAA rules and regulations reflect
unconscious racial or cultural bias? Indeed not just initial eligibility, but other NCAA
rules, such as those involving financial limitations imposed on student-athletes,
disparately impact African-American student-athletes.227 Such harm results from the
dissonance between NCAA rules and the economic and social realities of African-
Americans' life experiences.228 The consequence of this incongruence is not the
unfairness discussed above, but the marginalization by African-American student-
athletes of the NCAA regulatory process.229
Professor Shropshire might also have explored more extensively the harms
caused by stereotypes to other educational as well as social, economic, and psycho-
logical interests of black student-athletes ° Indeed, a mind set nurtured by these
stereotypes results in the exclusion of "African-American student-athletes from the
academic and social mainstream in many predominately white colleges and univer-
sities,"" t with the potential exploitation of their athletic abilities for financial
reasons
232
Similarly, the underrepresentation of African-Americans in college sports
administration is derived from the negative stereotypes that nurture unconscious
racism. In turn, collectively they serve to limit the opportunities for African-
Americans to move into power positions in sports. I previously wrote: "The
inequality of access for blacks to the administration of college athletics demonstrates
the persistent influence of a particular racial stereotype: the black athlete as inferior,,233
to the white athlete regarding intellectual and leadership abilities. While Professor
Shropshire touches on these broader considerations, more explicit and detailed
discussion would have been instructive. It also would have allowed him to establish
more firmly the applicability of those strands of his theoretical premises relating to
colorblindness and the limits of antidiscrimination in the collegiate context.
226. Id.
227. See generally Timothy Davis, African-Anerican Student-Athletes: Marginalizing the NCAA Regulatory
Structure?, 6 MARQ. SPORTS LJ. 199 (1996) [hereinafter Davis, African-Amnerican Student-Athletes].
228. See generally Anderson, supra note 12; Davis, African-American Student-Athletes, supra note 227.
229. See generally Anderson, supra note 12.
230. Id. at 368-71; Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 668-78.
231. Davis, Myth of the Superspade, supra note 10, at 669; see Anderson, supra note 12, at 370-71
(commenting on the academic and social marginalization of African-American student-athletes); Edwards, supra
note 3, at 99 (noting the social isolation many black athletes encounter at predominantly white institutions).
232. See Smith, supra note 11, at 348 (arguing that the "fact that African-American athletes dominate in the
revenue producing sports raises concerns that the athletes are being exploited or taken advantage of for financial
reasons); see also Davis, African-American Student-Athletes, supra note 227. at 224-26 (voicing similar concerns).
233. Davis, supra note 10, at 657; see Anderson, supra note 12, at 363; see also Smith, supra note 11, at 333-
34.
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VIII. AGENT SELECTION
In Chapter Six, entitled "The White Man's Ice is Colder, His Sugar Sweeter, His
Water Wetter, His Medicine Better: Sports Agents," Professor Shropshire artfully
weaves his views regarding the significance of stereotypes of African-Americans into
his discussion of racism in agent selection. Once more, he relies on statistics to aid
in telling his story. Professor Shropshire tells the reader that in 1992, 150 of the 200
agents registered to represent Major League Baseball players had an active
clientele. - African-American agents accounted for a mere three percent of this
150.235 In professional football, African-Americans made up fourteen percent of the
registered agents with active files.
236
In analyzing these numbers, Professor Shropshire concedes that one would not
expect to see exact correlations between African-American athletes and agents.237 He
nevertheless argues that given the substantial numbers of African-American athletes
currently participating in professional sports, "a greater African-American presence
in the agent business than the percentages noted would seem reasonable.
' 3
Professor Shropshire attributes the seeming reluctance of African-American
athletes to select agents of their race to a number of factors. These factors include the
historical allegiance of black athletes to white agents, the negative rhetoric of white
agents and the media regarding the professional capabilities of black agents, and the
resources available to white agents to woo black athletes.Y9 Notwithstanding the
significance of these factors, Professor Shropshire believes that lingering perceptions
regarding whites possessing business acumen superior to that of blacks are perhaps
the most influential.24° Through the use of stories, Professor Shropshire demonstrates
that the influence of this perception is not unique to sports. In so doing, he makes the
case that the reluctance to retain black professionals as sports agents reflects attitudes
that are deeply rooted in American society.
Professor Shropshire contends that even though most would perceive that agent
selection is colorblind, race is indeed a factor.24' Historically, he contends it has been242
taken into account to the detriment of African-Americans. In this regard, he states
that "[r]ace has always been a factor, but one in which being white was positive and
black negative. ' 243 To counter this reality, Professor Shropshire argues for
234. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 131.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 131.
237. Id. at 131-32.
238. Id. at 132.
239. Id. at 134-35.
240. Id. at 135.
241. Id. at 137-38.
242. Id. at 138.
243. Id.
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consciously taking race into account in hiring agents?44 He offers economic and
sociological justifications for his position that race should be among the many
qualifications that athletes consider when selecting an agent.245 After noting the
impotency of the law to increase the hiring of black agents, Professor Shropshire
offers suggestions of how to increase the use of black agents. 246 Although he does not
expressly state so, he suggests that a change in perception must occur for black
agents to emerge as equal participants in professional sports. He suggests that key
black athletes, by hiring black agents and speaking out on the issue, may help to
effectuate this change of practice and mind set.247 However, like other commentators,
he acknowledges that changing such deeply-held beliefs will not be easy. Addressing
this issue, one scholar argues that "for perspective, definitions, and direction relative
to sports, its potential, and proper priority, the black athlete has, therefore, become
increasingly more reliant upon conventional wisdom, coaches, athletic boosters,
recruiters, and school alumni, and an impersonal... mainstream sports media which
are the most influential force defining sports-related realities. 248 Professor
Shropshire argues that a "positive expression of race consciousness" occurs when
black athletes consider race as a variable in hiring black agents? 49 However, the
occurrence of such an expression will require the development of a level of racial
identification and consciousness from which athletes are arguably shielded during
their athletic careers.
IX. SHROPSHIRE'S CONCLUSIONS
In the concluding chapter---"The Next Millennium"-Professor Shropshire
reiterates many of the themes shared throughout In Black and White. He argues that
achieving the ideal level of diversity in sports will first require recognition of racism
as limiting opportunities.250 He next asserts that recognition of this problem must be
followed by a transition "period where racial diversity is the standard."' Professor
Shropshire believes a form of affirmative action "focusing on breaking down the
sports old boy network is the vehicle for arriving at this diversity. ' '252 Suspecting that
sports represents a segment of society in which racism will remain a permanent part,
he asserts that efforts aimed at diversity will at a minimum create a "more repre-
sentative role and improved status for African-Americans. ' z 3
244. Id.
245. Id. at 137.
246. Id. at 130.
247. Id. at 141.
248. Edwards, supra note 3, at 97.
249. SHROPSHIRE, supra note 1, at 133.
250. Id. at 143.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 146.
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Professor Shropshire reiterates his view that traditional antidiscrimination laws
will be of extremely limited usefulness in increasing diversity in sports leadership.2
This increases the significance of voluntary action by those in positions of power.
Consequently, he urges professional and collegiate sports power brokers to engage
in proactive efforts to enhance racial diversity in sports ownership and manage-
ment. 5 Additionally, Professor Shropshire also envisions a significant role for black
athletes., He calls upon them to use the leverage that their distinctive power as
athletes provides to act on behalf of diversifying sports' upper levels. 6
Despite his belief that concerted action by those internal and external to sports
is the key to improving racial equity, he recognizes the obstacles confronting those
who take up the challenge. For instance, while calling on athletes to become more
active, he recognizes that their socialization militates against them doing so5
7
Similarly, he acknowledges that it will take time to change the "hearts, minds, ideas,
and beliefs of sports leadership. ''2 8 Indeed, Professor Shropshire concludes with a
story that reinforces his beliefs regarding the slow-going process involved in
changing perceptions and attitudes. He shares with readers his experiences at a sports
law conference at which he had given a presentation on affirmative action in sports
franchise front offices.29 He characterizes the reactions of many of those in atten-
dance as "you couldn't possibly be talking about me."2 This unspoken convergence
of disbelief and denial implies that regardless of the plans that are set into motion,
the critical determinant in changing the racial composition in the upper echelons of
sports will require a concomittnt change in perspective by those in positions of
power in sports. In recounting this story, Professor Shropshire effectively tempers
the idealistic call for concerted action as a means of eradicating the unconscious
racism that denies complete equality for African-Americans involved in sports.
One of Professor Shropshire's goals in writing In Black and White was to
identify and assess the impact of racism on African-Americans involved in pro-
fessional sports. He convincingly achieves this objective. His theoretical framework
allows readers to understand the complexity of the issue of race in sports. Moreover,
it provides a perspective from which to view the underlying causes that result in
African-Americans being denied opportunities in the upper echelons of sports. While
Professor Shropshire does not always fully integrate his theoretical methodology into
his examination of specific issues, he has written an insightful book that should
stimulate dialogue. In so doing, he brings into sharp focus an often overlooked issue:
racism in athletics.
254. Id. at 58.
255. Id. at 144.
256. Id. at 146.
257. Id. at 158.
258. Id.
259. Id. at 159.
260. Id.
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